The Creation of the Conditions for Consociational Democracy and Its Development in Interwar Czechoslovakia by Howe, Philip J. et al.
1 This article is a brief version of a book-length study the authors are preparing that explores
the topic of consociationalism in Imperial Austria between 1867 and 1914, the Czecho-
slovak First Republic between 1918 and 1938, and Slovakia during the Czechoslovak First
Republic. The University of West Florida, through the Office of Research and Sponsored
Programs, funded a portion of Miller’s research for this article. The Adrian College
Association of Professors and the European Institutes for Advanced Studies funded por-
tions of Howe’s research.
2 Although this is not the place for a comprehensive review, those who wish to explore this
vast literature may begin with Lijphart, Arend: Democracy in Plural Societies. A
Comparative Exploration. New Haven 1977. – See also Lijphart: The Puzzle of Indian
Democracy. A Consociational Interpretation. In: American Political Science Review 90
(1996) no. 2, 258-268. – The latter also appears in Lijphart (ed.): Thinking about Demo-
cracy. Power Sharing and Majority Rule in Theory and Practice. London 2008, which
provides a comprehensive overview of Lijphart’s work. – Although not directly about con-
sociationalism, Lijphart: Patterns of Democracy. New Haven 1999. 2nd edition classifies
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Social scientists accept that Austria after the Second World War fits the pattern of
consociationalism, a form of democracy that ensures representation for all segments
in deeply divided societies. Many also contend that the Czech and Slovak Federative
Republic, after the fall of communism, and its successors, the Czech Republic and
Slovakia, exhibit consociational features. Nevertheless, few consider the roots of
consociationalism in these states, and those who have done so have presented only
cursory explanations or erred in applying the theory. In reality, consociational
arrangements began to develop in the Habsburg Monarchy, during the latter half of
the 19th century. Consociational democracy also existed in Austria from 1918 until
the middle of the 1920s and in Czechoslovakia from 1918 until the 1938 Munich
Agreement. When viewing these historical cases, many scholars mistakenly see
certain political traits as failures of democracy; in fact, they are means of ensuring
inclusion and political compromise. After presenting a brief overview of the con-
sociational model, this article will consider three cases of consociationalism in
Central Europe: the progress of Imperial Austria toward democracy, the Czecho-
slovak First Republic as a consociational state, and Slovakia’s democratic develop-
ment within interwar Czechoslovakia.
The political scientist Arend Lijphart (born 1936) developed the consociational
model in reaction to two long-standing but insufficiently examined themes in the
comparative study of democracy: first, the claim that social homogeneity is a pre-
requisite for stable democracy; and second, the largely unquestioned equation of
democracy with majority rule.2 By examining political institutions and practices in
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his native Netherlands in the 1950s and 1960s, and by expanding this analysis to
include the Austrian Second Republic, Belgium, and Switzerland, Lijphart argued
that plural societies with segmental cleavages – those societies in which parties and
private associations tend to be organized along linguistic, ethnic, religious, or ideo-
logical lines – can build stable democracies. He and other political scientists have
applied the theory fruitfully to a number of such plural societies, including Colom-
bia, Cyprus, Czechoslovakia between 1989 and 1992, India, Lebanon, Luxembourg,
and Malaysia, while some scholars have identified consociational characteristics in
nondemocratic states, such as Bolivia, Ethiopia, Ivory Coast, the Ottoman Empire,
Paraguay, the Soviet Union, Uganda, and Yugoslavia.3 Scholars have used the con-
sociational model to assess a growing number of other political systems, including
those of Bosnia and Herzegovina, Burundi, Canada, Congo, the European Union,
Fiji, Gambia, Indonesia, Iraq, Israel, Italy, Kashmir, Kenya, Kosovo, Liechtenstein,
Macedonia, Montenegro, Netherlands Antilles, Nigeria, Northern Ireland, Re-
publika Srpska, Rwanda, Serbia, Sri Lanka, Suriname, Uruguay, and Venezuela.4
Recent studies even have begun to apply consociational theory to city-level polit-
ics in Aceh, Baghdad, Belfast, Brussels, Jerusalem, Johannesburg, Kirkuk, and Sara-
democratic political systems in terms of how majoritarian or consensual they are, thereby
illustrating the great variety of possible democratic institutions. – Finally, surveys of cur-
rent debates and developments in consociational research appear in Köppl, Stefan/Kranen-
pohl, Uwe (eds.): Konkordanzdemokratie. Ein Demokratietyp der Vergangenheit? Baden-
Baden 2012. – See also McEvoy, Joanne/O’Leary, Brendan (eds.): Power Sharing in Deeply
Divided Places. Philadelphia 2013.
3 Andeweg, Rudy B.: Consociational Democracy. In: Annual Review of Political Science 3
(2000) 509-536, here 514. – Lijphart: The Puzzle of Indian Democracy 258 (cf. fn. 2) dis-
cusses the first set of cases. – Esman, Milton J.: Power Sharing and the Constructivist
Fallacy. In: Crepaz, Markus M. L./Koelble, Thomas A./Wilsford, David: Democracy and
Institutions: The Life Work of Arend Lijphart. Michigan 2000, 91-112. – Lijphart: The
Puzzle of Indian Democracy 258 (cf. fn. 2) for the second set.
4 Andeweg: Consociational Democracy 514-515 (cf. fn. 3). – Belloni, Roberto: State Building
and International Intervention in Bosnia. New York 2007. – Bieber, Florian: The Balkans:
The Promotion of Power Sharing by Outsiders. In: McEvoy/O’Leary: Power Sharing in
Deeply Divided Places 312-326 (cf. fn. 2). – Bogaards, Matthijs/Crepaz, Markus M.L.:
Consociational Interpretations of the European Union. In: European Union Politics 3
(2002) no. 3, 357-381. – Cairns, Ed: Northern Ireland: Power Sharing, Contact, Identity,
and Leadership. In: McEvoy/O’Leary: Power Sharing in Deeply Divided Places 278-294
(cf. fn. 2). – Irwin, Colin: Public Opinion and Power Sharing in Deeply Divided Places. 
In: Ibid. 295-311 (cf. fn. 2). – Lijphart: Democracy in Plural Societies chaps. 4-6 (cf. 
fn. 2). – Lijphart: The Puzzle of Indian Democracy 258 (cf. fn. 2). – McCulloch, Allison:
Power-Sharing and Political Stability in Deeply Divided Societies. London, New York
2014. – McCulloch, Allison: The Track Record of Centripetalism in Deeply Divided Places.
In: McEvoy/O’Leary: Power Sharing in Deeply Divided Places 94-111 (cf. fn. 2). –
McEvoy, Joanne: We Forbid! The Mutual Veto and Power-Sharing Democracy. In: Ibid.
253-277 (cf. fn, 2). – McGarry, John/O’Leary, Brendan: Iraq’s Constitution of 2005:
Liberal Consociationalism as Political Prescription. In: International Journal of Con-
stitutional Law 5 (2007) no. 4, 670-698. – Merdzanovic, Adis: Democracy by Decree:
Prospects and Limits of Imposed Consociational Democracy in Bosnia and Herzegovina.
Stuttgart 2015. – Taylor, Rupert (ed.): Consociational Theory: McGarry and O’Leary and
the Northern Ireland Conflict. New York 2009.
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jevo.5 Most important, in the last decades, such deeply divided societies as Bosnia
and Herzegovina, Northern Ireland, and post-apartheid South Africa have adopted
consociational democratic solutions.6
To curtail conflict, consociationalism ideally includes representatives of every
major group in the decision-making process, while it excludes from consideration
particularly divisive issues, such as language, education, and religion. It accomplishes
these tasks through four vehicles. First is the grand coalition. Although the term
conventionally refers to cabinets involving all of the major political parties, the
defining feature of a Lijphartian grand coalition is that it includes members of all of
the major groups or segmental cleavages in a given country. Lijphartian grand coali-
tions, therefore, may be grand coalitions in the conventional sense, but they also may
involve alternative arrangements, such as mandatory representation in cabinets for
major linguistic or other groups, a system of advisory councils outside the cabinet,
or the allocation of the presidency or premiership to members of specified groups.
In this article, a partial grand coalition indicates governments that nearly conform to
the Lijphartian grand coalition model but exclude one of the major groups and per-
haps some less important groups. Second is segmental autonomy, which might
include territorial federalism, autonomous but publicly funded schools for each
group, and separate personal laws concerning marriage, divorce, child custody, child
adoption, and inheritance. Third is proportionality, which refers to the fair distribu-
tion of seats among groups through the use of electoral formulas, districts with
exclusive nominating rights for minority parties, reserved seats for minority repres-
entatives, overrepresented minorities, or artificial parity in awarding mandates. It
often extends to the proportional allocation of civil service jobs and public funds.
Finally, the minority or mutual veto empowers members of minority groups to
block legislation that threatens their interests. This often is an informal practice, and
in well-functioning consociational democracies, its actual use is rare.
Lijphart listed nine conditions that favor consociationalism, none of which are
either necessary or sufficient for its success. In other words, it is possible for conso-
ciationalism to fail, even if all nine conditions are met, and it is possible, although
unlikely, for it to succeed without meeting any of them. The first two are the most
important: 1) the absence of a unified majority based on ethnicity, religion, or ideol-
ogy; and 2) the lack of large socioeconomic disparities among the groups. There are
seven remaining favorable conditions: 3) the presence of a relatively small number of
5 Anderson, Liam: Power Sharing in Kirkuk: The Need for Compromise. In: McEvoy/
O’Leary: Power Sharing in Deeply Divided Places 365-385 (cf. fn. 2). – Bollens, Scott A.:
Governing Polarized Cities. In: Ibid. 327-363 (cf. fn. 2). – Stepan, Alfred: A Revised Theory
of Federacy and a Case Study of Civil War Termination in Aceh, Indonesia. In: Ibid. 231-
252 (cf. fn. 2).
6 Andeweg: Consociational Democracy 516-517 (cf. fn. 3). – Bieber: The Balkans (cf. fn. 4).
– Cairns: Northern Ireland (cf. fn. 4). – Guelke, Adrian: Politics in Deeply Divided
Societies. Malden 2012. – Irwin: Public Opinion (cf. fn. 4). – Issacharoff, Samuel: Courts,
Constitutions, and the Limits of Majoritarianism. In: McEvoy/ O’Leary: Power Sharing in
Deeply Divided Places 214-227 (cf. fn. 2). – McEvoy: We Forbid! (cf. fn. 4). – McCulloch:
Power-Sharing and Political Stability (cf. fn. 4). – Merdzanovic: Democracy by Decree (cf.
fn. 4).
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groups; 4) the existence of groups that are “roughly the same size”; 5) a population
that is relatively small; 6) the presence of “external dangers” that “promote internal
unity” to stave off occupation or partition; 7) a series of “overarching loyalties”,
such as a unifying national identiy or a monarch, that can appeal to all segments of
the society; 8) a concentration of groups in geographic areas that facilitates territori-
al federalism; and 9) “traditions of compromise and accommodation” that histori-
cally bind together the various segments in order to govern the state.7
The 1867 Ausgleich made the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy two distinct consti-
tutional entities, Imperial Austria and the Kingdom of Hungary, which shared a
common monarch and a number of joint institutions. There were common min-
istries of foreign affairs, the military, and joint finances. Otherwise, each half of the
Dual Monarchy had its own cabinet, with individual interior, finance, and other
ministries, and each had its own legislature – the Imperial Austrian Reichsrat and the
Hungarian Országgyűlés. In the Austrian half of the monarchy, significant restric-
tions on democracy resulted from several factors: dualism itself, since the Reichsrat
lacked jurisdiction over Austro-Hungarian joint interests; the executive, who was
unelected and formally unaccountable; the upper house, which also was unelected;
and the 17 provincial governments, which handled specific policy areas in a federal-
ist arrangement and had diets that never fully adopted universal manhood suffrage.
Although Austria did not become a democracy at that time, a series of electoral
reforms gradually moved its representative institutions in that direction. As of 1907,
universal manhood suffrage applied to the lower house of parliament, and voter
turnout remained high in elections, which involved competition among numerous,
ideologically diverse mass parties.8
With its population of Czechs, Germans, Italians, Poles, Rusyns, Slovenes, and
Ukrainians, along with smaller ethnic groups, including Croats, Jews, Roma, Ro-
manians, and Serbs, Austria was very much a plural society. Political parties, public
organizations, and private associations were divided along segmental lines. Several
favorable conditions for consociationalism were present, including the absence of an
ethnic or ideological majority. Most of the population was Catholic; however, ethnic
and ideological factors prevented Catholicism from acting as a unifying political
force. Imperial Austria also had a rough balance in group size, socioeconomic in-
terests that cut across ethnic lines, and a common tradition of Habsburg rule. Certain
other factors were ambiguous or negative: external threats were both unifying, in
that they could encourage loyalty to the dynasty, and divisive, such as irridentism
that inflamed nationalist tensions; a history of both conflict and cooperation among
the political elite; a large number of groups; some geographically dispersed groups;
7 Lijphart: Democracy in Plural Societies ch. 3 (cf. fn. 2). – Lijphart: The Puzzle of Indian
Democracy 262-263 (cf. fn. 2).
8 In the decade before the First World War, the contrast between Imperial Austria, which was
beginning to display features of consociationalism, and the Kingdom of Hungary is worth
emphasizing. In Hungary, ongoing restrictions on voting rights and the absence of federal-
ism helped concentrate power in the hands of a Hungarian-speaking elite that increasingly
pursued a policy of Magyarization toward the non-Hungarian minorities. 
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and a relatively large population, which in 1910 was approximately 28,572,000. In
short, although conditions were not ideal, Imperial Austria had good potential for
successfully adopting consociational politics.
The Imperial Austrian system of government gradually approximated all four
characteristics of consociationalism. The distribution of parliamentary mandates by
ethnic group was increasingly proportional, and after the earliest electoral reforms,
no group had a majority. Civil service employment also was increasingly pro-
portional. Language controversies notwithstanding, bureaucrats communicated with
the local populations in their own languages. Precedents existed for partitioning uni-
versities along ethnic lines, and the language of primary and secondary education
increasingly corresponded to local language use. These developments, along with the
ongoing segregation of organizations, furthered segmental autonomy.
The structure of the executive and parliamentary procedure provided a de facto
minority veto by allowing small groups to obstruct legislative action. One colorful
illustration of this is the famous Badeni crisis, in which violent obstruction by
German elected representatives led to the repeal of the controversial language ordin-
ances for Bohemia and the downfall of the government of Count Kasimir Felix
Badeni (1846-1909). While the crisis was hardly a model of democratic parliament-
ary politics and did much to harm the parliament’s long-term legitimacy, it demon-
strated how a legislative minority could block policies that harmed the interests of
the group they represented. Such action also could prevent the imperial government
from bypassing the legislature in order to enact certain policies. Furthermore, al-
though Imperial cabinets never embraced the ideal of the grand coalition, at least in
the strict sense, they tended to include representatives from the three largest ethnic
groups – Czechs, Germans, and Poles – and a diverse cross section of parties. The
main exception was the Social Democrats, but grand coalitions frequently exclude
important parties.9 The threat of obstruction required that governments maintain the
tacit backing of a supermajority, thereby significantly broadening their effective base
within the legislature.10
Even stronger parallels to consociationalism occurred in the regional interethnic
compromises in the crown lands of Moravia, Bukovina, and Galicia as well as the
city of České Budějovice, although the latter two never took effect because of the
First World War. These were part of a general trend, since there was talk of similar
9 For example, Austrian grand coalitions, for many years after the Second World War, in-
cluded the Social Democratic Party (SPÖ) and the conservative Austrian People’s Party
(ÖVP), but not the national-liberal Austrian Freedom Party (FPÖ). Similarly, although
Switzerland’s so-called magic formula has required inclusion of the four largest parties in
the cabinet, the specific parties it included have varied over time.
10 Höbelt, Lothar: “Well-tempered Discontent”: Austrian Domestic Politics. In: Cornwall,
Mark (ed.): The Last Years of Austria-Hungary. A Multi-National Experiment in Early
Twentieth-Century Europe. Exeter 2002 (revised and expanded edition) 44-74. – Höbelt,
Lothar: Parteien und Fraktionen im Cisleithanischen Reichsrat. In: Rumpler, Helmut/
Urbanitsch, Peter (eds.): Die Habsburgermonarchie 1848-1918. Band 7: Verfassung und
Parlamentarismus, Teil 1: Verfassungsrecht, Verfassungswirklichkeit, zentrale Repräsen-
tativkörperschaften. Wien 2000, 895-1006.
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compromises in the Crown Land of Bohemia and the city of Olomouc as well as in
Bosnia and Herzegovina, the administration of which Austria and Hungary shared.
These compromises typically involved arrangements to secure the representation of
all major ethnic groups through Wahlkataster (registers of voters), each with its own
mandates in the provincial diets or town councils. Minorities typically were over-
represented, enabling them to block legislation that threatened their interests. For
example, the 1905 Moravian Compromise designated 73 seats in the diet for Czechs,
40 for Germans, 30 for provincial aristocrats and great landowners, 6 for the cham-
bers of commerce members, and 2 for high ecclesiastical figures. Czechs, who were
in the majority, had less than half the seats, while Germans, constituting about 28 per
cent of the population, were overrepresented in the diet, since Germans predomi-
nated among the provincial aristocrats, great landowners, chambers of commerce
members, and high ecclesiastics. The reorganized provincial executive committee
included 4 Czechs, 2 Germans, and 2 great landowners. Furthermore, there were
separate school boards, at the provincial and local levels, and school children 
received an education in their own languages; however, Moravia, unlike Bohemia,
did not have separate Czech and German universities.
These reforms, as well as those in the other provinces, may have been consocia-
tional, but they did not create completely democratic systems. Electoral reforms
between 1867 and 1907 introduced universal manhood suffrage on the parliamentary
level. By contrast, while the provincial diets gradually expanded suffrage, they
retained the older system of curial voting, whereby major socio-economic groups
each had a specified number of seats, a system that heavily overrepresented capital-
ists and great landowners. While many provinces eventually added an additional
curia, elected through universal manhood suffrage, they still retained the traditional
curiae. Furthermore, the Kaiser continued to appoint both Landeshauptmänner
(provincial governors) and imperial ministers.
Historians’ accounts of the Austrian Parliament have been largely negative.
Nevertheless, an explosion of parliamentary, provincial, and party histories in recent
decades has led to a more nuanced view of the Reichsrat and a greater respect for its
accomplishments. Criticisms of the Austrian parliament often reflect an implicit
Westminsterian or majoritarian bias. Meanwhile, unfamiliarity with the political sci-
ence literature on consociationalism has led historians to misinterpret consociation-
al elements in both the overall political system and in the various regional comprom-
ises.
Soloman Wank (1930-2014) presented several commonly cited criticisms of the
Moravian and other compromises: they were the result of peculiar local conditions
and were inapplicable elsewhere; they were not actual compromises but rather a sep-
aration of groups; and they were undemocratic because they consolidated the priv-
ileged position of the aristocracy and the ethnic minorities, thereby blocking hopes
for fundamental change.11 The first of these objections is problematic, given the
broad range of conditions under which consociationalism is said to be feasible and
11 Wank, Soloman: Some Reflections on the Habsburg Empire and Its Legacy in the Nation-
alities Question. In: Austrian History Yearbook 28 (1997) 131-146, here 144-145.
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given Lijphart’s insistence that none of his nine favorable conditions are strictly ne-
cessary. One cannot rule out the possibility that such compromises might have
worked in Bohemia or elsewhere, and their spread suggests that they had a broad
appeal. The second objection is actually a basic premise of consociationalism because
the apparent loss of fraternity inherent in the compromises is the price for stable le-
gislative politics. Even the critics concede that they did just that.12 Finally, the third
objection is actually more concerned with oligarchy than with consociationalism. It
is reasonable to suppose that the gradual expansion of the suffrage, on all levels of
Austrian politics, might have continued, had war not intervened. Further, successful
provincial oligarchic compromises fostered a tradition of elite accommodation, a
favorable condition that could have facilitated future, more democratic consocia-
tional developments. Finally, the overrepresentation of Germans and other minor-
ities is a standard consociational mechanism for defending minority interests.
An additional set of criticisms arises from a growing historical literature on
national flexibility in the Habsburg Monarchy, a literature that challenges the “real-
ism of the nation” by examining such phenomena as national indifference, multilin-
gualism, dynastic loyalism, and individuals changing national identities or holding
multiple ones simultaneously.13 Drawing on and reacting to that literature, critics of
the ethnicizing of politics are particularly concerned with the negative consequences
of establishing national Wahlkataster and segregated schools.14 According to this line 
of criticism, not only did these policies falsely presume a population divided along
clearly defined national lines, but they also involved a significant intrusion of gov-
12 Glassl, Horst: Der Mährische Ausgleich. München 1967, 244. – Kelly, T. Mills: Last Best
Chance or Last Gasp? The Compromise of 1905 and Czech Politics in Moravia. In:
Austrian History Yearbook 34 (2003) 279-301, here 300-301. – Stourzh, Gerald: The
Ethnicizing of Politics and “National Indifference” in Late Imperial Austria. In: Stourzh
(ed.): Der Umfang der österreichischen Geschichte. Ausgewählte Studien 1990-2010. Wien
2011, 283-322, here 310.
13 On “the realism of the nation”, see Brubaker, Rogers: Nationalism Reframed. Nationhood
and the National Question in the New Europe. Cambridge 1996. – A key monograph in
this literature is King, Jeremy: Budweisers into Czechs and Germans. A Local History of
Bohemian Politics 1848-1948. Princeton 2002. – There are other major works to consider,
such as the Austrian History Yearbook 43 (2012). – Brix, Emil: Die Umgangssprachen in
Altösterreich zwischen Agitation und Assimilation: Die Sprachenstatistik in den zisleitha-
nischen Volkszählungen, 1880 bis 1910. Wien 1982 (Veröffentlichungen der Kommission
für Neuere Geschichte Österreichs 72). – Cohen, Gary B.: The Politics of Ethnic Survival.
West Lafayette 2006. 2nd revised edition. – Cole, Laurence/Unowsky, Daniel L. (eds.): The
Limits of Loyalty: Imperial Symbolism, Popular Allegiances, and State Patriotism in the
Late Habsburg Monarchy. Oxford, New York 2007. – Judson, Pieter M.: Guardians of the
Nation: Activists on the Language Frontiers of Imperial Austria. Cambridge 2006. –
Judson/Rozenblit, Marsha L. (eds.): Constructing Nationalities in East Central Europe.
New York 2005. – Zahra, Tara: Kidnapped Souls. National Indifference and the Battle for
Children in the Bohemian Lands 1900-1948. Ithaca 2008.
14 Burger, Hannelore: Der Verlust der Mehrsprachigkeit. Aspekte des Mährischen Ausgleichs.
In: Bohemia 34 (1993) no. 1, 77-89. – Stourzh, Gerald: Ethnic Attribution in Late Imperial
Austria. Good Intentions, Evil Consequences. In: Robertson, Ritchie/Timms, Edward: The
Habsburg Legacy. National Identity in Historical Perspective. Edinburgh 1994, 67-83. –
Zahra: Kidnapped Souls (cf. fn. 13).
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ernment into private life, in order to determine the correct identity of individuals,
thereby setting a dangerous precedent for ethnic group membership trumping
citizenship.
In arguing that consociationalism “increases the plural nature of an already plural
society”, consociational theory acknowledges the somewhat artificial character of
group distinctions that, nevertheless, promote democratic stability.15 Critics raise
important concerns about the possible consequences, for ordinary citizens, of such
arrangements, and this, in turn, suggests possible new areas for research, specifically
into the question of whether nationalist abuses of consociational arrangements were
unique to Imperial Austria.16 Even so, scholars must not overlook Austria’s impor-
tant contributions to practical politics. Nations may not be real, but nationalists are
a reality, and any means of guiding their political activities in a less conflictual and a
more democratic direction is worth taking seriously. Unknowingly, Austrian politi-
cians experimented with policies that have become standard tools for promoting
democratic stability in divided societies decades before political scientists even
recognized or named them.17
Building on Imperial Austria’s proto-consociational legacy, interwar Czecho-
slovakia evolved as a consociational democracy. The Czechoslovak First Republic
had 18 governments, in its two decades of existence, including 3 bureaucratic cabin-
ets. Mixed cabinets of politicians and experts were the rule, all governments were
coalitions, and no government lived out its term. German parties, which represen-
ted 23 per cent of the population, refused to participate in the parliament until 1920;
however, once they had entered the cabinet in 1926, they remained a part of all gov-
erning coalitions until the end of the republic. While these and other features of the
Czechoslovak political scene, during the 1920s and 1930s, have been baffling for
many, even for a few political actors at the time, they do not provide evidence that
the republic’s democracy was inherently faulty. Instead, they are manifestations of
consociationalism.
Czechoslovakia met all nine of Lijphart’s favorable conditions. First, there was 
no unified majority because the multinational population included Czechs (50 per
cent) and Slovaks (16 per cent), Germans (23 per cent), and small percentages of
15 Lijphart: Democracy in Plural Societies 42 (cf. fn. 2).
16 The consociational literature already addressed many concerns these critics raised. Spe-
cifically, a general consensus has developed among political scientists in favor of “liberal
consociationalism”, which allows individuals to self-select their group membership, as
opposed to “corporate consociationalism”, in which ascribed traits define fixed groups. See
McEvoy/O’Leary: Power Sharing in Deeply Divided Places 27-28 (cf. fn. 2). – McGarry/
O’Leary: Iraq’s Constitution (cf. fn.4). Both defenders and critics of Imperial Austria’s
regional compromises can benefit from the broader perspective that the consociational lit-
erature provides.
17 Although Imperial Austria predates the consociational model, a number of its intellectuals,
in particular the Austro-Marxists, foreshadowed important consociational themes through
their theory of “personal autonomy”. See Lijphart, Arend: Introduction: Developments in
Power Sharing Theory. In: Lijphart: Thinking about Democracy 3-22, here 4 (cf. fn. 2).
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Hungarians, Rusyns, Jews, Poles, and Roma.18 There was no predominant ideolo-
gical tendency, although socialism, agrarianism, and Christian socialism attracted the
greatest amount of support. In terms of religion, Catholics formed 74 per cent of the
population; however, even though most were Czechs and Slovaks, they did not act
with one voice, and many Catholics, especially Czechs, were indifferent about
religion.19 Second, despite the fact that the Bohemian Lands were far more industri-
alized and wealthier than the eastern provinces, the living standards in the east, when
viewed as a whole, improved in the 1920s and 1930s. Furthermore, the segments in
the country had no great disparities in socioeconomic status, since there were sim-
ilarities in the living standards of industrial workers and agriculturalists, both of
whom formed the majority of the population. Notwithstanding that Germans were
overrepresented as owners of industry and finance, there were plenty of Czech
industrialists, financiers, and large landowners, and some even were Slovak,
Hungarian, or Jewish.20 Third, there were not many segments, when one considers
that there were three main ethnic groups, two main religions, and three predominant
ideologies. Throughout the 1920s and well into the 1930s, there were fewer than ten
major political parties, representing five different political currents: socialism, agrar-
ianism, and Christian socialism, the strongest, as well as communism and the con-
servative liberalism of the wealthy. The success of the anti-system Sudeten German
party in the 1935 elections enabled German nationalism to stake a claim as a major
political current, with only one seat less than the Republican (Agrarian) Party, but it
had no allies with whom to form a governing coalition. Fourth, the most important
segments of the society were reasonably balanced. Half the country was Czech,
while the other half was a mixture of ethnic groups, including Slovaks; nonetheless,
the common ethnic origins of the Czechs and Slovaks did not guarantee unity, de-
spite the ideology of Czechoslovakism. In terms of religion, no group – Catholics,
Protestants, those who were not religious, and those who were religiously indiffer-
ent – had an advantage in numbers. Even though the 1920 elections gave the Social
Democrats a significant plurality of seats in the National Assembly, after the 1925
election, the party with a plurality generally had an advantage of only a few seats.
Fifth, the country’s population was small, in comparison to some of its neighbours,
yet it was larger than Europe’s other consociational states. Sixth, the republic had its
18 There is a large body of literature, which is too lengthy to present here, that considers the
ethnic groups of Czechoslovakia. Examinations of the relationships among Czechs,
Germans, and Jews in Prague, for example, has a long history that began shortly after the
Second World War, with such works as Eisner, Paul: Franz Kafka and Prague. New York
1950. – It continues with the excellent contribution by Koeltzsch, Ines: Geteilte Kulturen.
Eine Geschichte der tschechisch-jüdisch-deutschen Beziehungen in Prag (1918-1938).
München 2012 (Veröffentlichungen des Collegium Carolinum 124).
19 Statistická ročenka Republiky československé, 1935 [Statistical Yearbook of the Czecho-
slovak Republic, 1935]. Praha 1935, Table II-7, 7 (ethnicity), and Table II-10, 8 (religion).
20 On German ownership of businesses, see Boyer, Christoph: “Staatspolitisch unzuver-
lässig”? Zur Loyalität der deutschen Wirtschaft in der Ersten Tschechoslowakischen Re-
publik. In: Schulze Wessel, Martin (ed.): Loyalitäten in der Tschechoslowakischen Republik
1918-1938: Politische, nationale und kulturelle Zugehörigkeiten. München 2004 (Veröffent-
lichungen des Collegium Carolinum 101) 113-140, here 114.
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share of external threats. Of the five states that bordered Czechoslovakia, only
Romania never claimed any of its territory. Seventh, Czechoslovakia had over-
arching loyalties, since economic, religious, and ideological divisions cut across
ethnic lines. The president until 1935, Tomáš G. Masaryk (1850-1937), was, in many
respects, a surrogate monarch who gained the respect of all ethnic groups. Antonín
Švehla (1870-1933), the Republican leader, was another adroit politician who served
to unite divergent interests. Occasionally, ethnic origin and shared religion bound
together Czechs and Slovaks. Civic nationalism, at times, prompted ethnic groups to
support coalition governments, certain policies, and economic prosperity. Even
sport, such as the renowned soccer World Cup team of 1934, cut across ethnic
lines.21 Eighth, despite some mixed areas, the ethnic, ideological, economic, and to
some extent, religious segments were concentrated geographically. Ninth, elite co-
operation was common. In politics, as in economics, compromise and accommoda-
tion were multifaceted. During the First Republic, various political parties entered
governing coalitions and cooperated in the legislature, while leading politicians, of
many colors, met informally, and those who cooperated with the president gathered
in a grouping known as the Hrad. These were extensions of the sort of cooperation
that existed among the parties, despite their disputes in the press, before the First
World War and even during the war, when the parties formed groupings to establish
common responses to policies and to present various demands. Finally, many polit-
ical leaders also enjoyed long-term personal friendships that predated the creation of
the republic.
Czechoslovakia exhibited all four components of consociationalism, the first of
which is the grand coalition. Throughout the interwar years, the most common
coalition type, accounting for 13 out of 15 political cabinets, was some form of
Lijphartian grand coalition, that is, a broad coalition that provided wide ethnic, ideo-
logical, and denominational diversity.22 The first 6 cabinets of this type, beginning
in 1921, were partial Lijphartian grand coalitions because, even though Czechs and
Slovaks in the major parties always held ministerial posts, the governments did not
contain representatives from the important German segment. Then, from 1926 to
1929, the cabinets included the so-called activist German parties, and from 1927 to
1929, they included the nationalist and autonomist Hlinka Slovak People’s Party
(HSĽS), but they did not involve the socialists.23 The following seven cabinets,
between 1929 and 1938, were full Lijphartian grand coalitions, with Czechs and
Slovaks in the statewide parties (despite the departure of the HSĽS from the gov-
ernment in 1929) as well as Germans. The total length of time for both types of
21 The 1934 FIFA World Cup team, which lost in the finals to Italy, included 18 Czechs, 2
Slovaks, 1 Hungarian, and 1 German, who was the noted player Ehrenfried Patzel (1904-
2004).
22 The two other cabinets, in 1919-1920, were part of the Red-Green Coalition of socialists
and Republicans. The second, incidentally, was a minority coalition that depended on the
cooperation of parties to the right in the legislature.
23 The Hlinka Slovak People’s Party received several invitations to join governments in the
1930s but never did so. The party, once simply known as the Slovak People’s Party, even-
tually took on the name of its founder, Andrej Hlinka (1864-1938).
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Lijphartian coalition cabinets was impressive: they covered 15 years of the republic’s
existence of 20 years, roughly half for the partial and half for the full Lijphartian
grand coalitions. It is apparent that the politicians felt comfortable working with the
consociational grand coalition model and strove to strengthen it, even in the worst
situation. For example, after the German activist parties had lost their constituencies
to the fascist Sudeten German Party, in the second half of the 1930s, the coalitions
still always included one or two of the German activist parties. Furthermore, over
time, the governments not only were regularly full Lijphartian grand coalitions but
also were more commonly oversized, that is, they included at least one more party
than they needed to form a majority in the legislature.
A Lijphartian grand coalition extends beyond governing coalitions to include
other official and unofficial links among the segments, as in the case of interwar
Czechoslovakia. In the 1920s, politicians cooperated through the extraparliamentary
and extraconstitutional Pětka (Committee of Five, 1920-1925) and its successors, the
Šestka (Committee of Six, 1925-1926), and the Osmička (Committee of Eight, 1926-
1929). These committees drew together the leaders of the governing parties, and they
had parallel institutions in the leadership and committees of the National Assembly
that, along with strict party discipline, made certain there was legislative support for
government measures. Even after socialist demands brought about the end of these
informal committees, the party leaders found it necessary to meet, in a similar fash-
ion, in the Political Committees (1929-1938) that were part of each cabinet.
Czechoslovakia was not federal, and no area was formally autonomous, but there
were mechanisms to recognize regional diversity, thereby assuring a measure of seg-
mental autonomy, consociationalism’s second component. Legislation provided for
the use of minority languages in the bureaucracy and schools. Electoral districts
guaranteed that ethnic groups had representation in the legislature. Quite significant
was that, beginning in 1918, the Ministry with Full Power for the Administration of
Slovakia, which dealt with Slovak affairs, the state Land Office, which carried out
the land reform, and the Ministry of Schools had branches that operated in Bratis-
lava. Ruthenia had an appointed governor and vice governor, and like Slovakia, it had
branch ministries in Uzhhorod. Then, as of July 1927, Bohemia, Moravia-Silesia,
Slovakia, and Ruthenia had uniform administrations that consisted of government-
appointed provincial presidents as well as assemblies, with Prague appointing one-
third of the representatives and the inhabitants electing the remaining two-thirds.
Some of the branch ministries remained in Bratislava and Uzhhorod. Finally, in
1937, the government devised plans for making Ruthenia autonomous, but it only
took the initial steps toward that end.24
Czechoslovakia had formal and informal means of ensuring proportionality.
Voting districts gave ethnic groups a proportional share of representatives in the le-
gislature – Czechs with about 50 per cent of the seats, Germans with about 25 per
24 Národní archiv v Praze [National Archive in Prague, NA], Předsednictvo ministerské rady
[Presidium of the Ministerial Council, PMR], microfilm 8195, inventory number 2960, car-
ton 4131, Protokol ze schůzí ministerské rady [Protocol of the Meeting of the Ministerial
Council], meeting 41, 19 March 1937.
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cent, Slovaks with about 17 per cent, and the remaining 8 per cent for the other
minorities. The parties allotted the leadership positions in the National Assembly,
according to the election results and in a way that further satisfied ethnic, ideolo-
gical, and socioeconomic interests. Proportional representation of competing ideolo-
gical groups was apparent in the parties represented in the legislature, all of the coali-
tion governments, and in the dominance the major parties had over certain ministries
and their staffs. Even though no formal procedures existed to guarantee positions for
the minorities, Czechs and Slovaks did not exclusively control the bureaucracy.
Before the peak of the Sudeten German crisis, the cabinet of Prime Minister Milan
Hodža (1878-1944) agreed to employ more minorities and to provide minority firms
with more government contracts, especially in minority districts.25 The officer corps
and ministries of health, social welfare, justice, and railways all contained minorities.
Schools were proportional, a result of the language law, and schools in Slovakia gen-
erally taught in Slovak, even though the students would have found Czech to be
intelligible. At times, respect for minority concerns came in other forms, such as the
state’s 1925 recognition of two additional religious holidays, 5 June, for commemor-
ating Sts. Cyril (827 or 828-869) and Methodius (815 to 820-885), who appealed 
primarily to Catholics, and 6 June, to celebrate the religious reformer Jan Hus (c.
1372-1415), who had inspired the Hussite and Czech Brethren Churches.26 In 1922,
in Znojmo, Czechs and Germans forged an agreement for representation on the city
council that reduced interethnic tensions, an echo of the regional interethnic com-
promises that had emerged during the Habsburg Monarchy.27 Even many civic
groups, including certain sport clubs, reserved leadership places for minorities. Of
course, instituting more proportionality guarantees was one way that the republic
could have strengthened its consociational character.
Finally, while the country had no formal mutual or minority veto, such an
arrangement functioned within the framework of elite cooperation, including the
extraparliamentary and extraconstitutional committees. To overcome roadblocks,
resulting from tacit mutual vetoes, logrolling allowed political parties to back each
other’s proposals. The mutual veto was apparent in March 1921, with the resignation
of Karel Engliš (1880-1961), as finance minister, owing to the objections of Alois
Rašín (1867-1923), the influential National Democrat, about Engliš’s handling of the
economy.28 An example of logrolling was the June 1926 approval of higher agricul-
25 NA, PMR, microfilm 8195, inventory number 2960, carton 4131, Protokol ze schůzí mini-
sterské rady [Protocol of the Meeting of the Ministerial Council], meeting 38, 18 February
1937, item 7, 18-19, “Otázky menšinové” [Minority Questions].
26 On national days in interwar Czechoslovakia, see the article of Andrea Talabér in this issue
of Bohemia. – For the immediate political repercussions of the politicians’ actions on 6 June
1925, see Miller, Daniel E.: Forging Political Compromise. Antonín Švehla and the Czecho-
slovak Republican Party 1918-1933. Pittsburgh 1999 (Pitt Series in Russian and East 
European Studies) 140.
27 Johannes Florian Kontny’s research on this topic resulted in his study “Securing Political
Rule in the Periphery? The Transformation of Municipalism in Eupen and Znojmo/Znaim
After the First World War (1918-1922)”, which appears in this issue of Bohemia.
28 Šetřilová, Jana: Alois Rašín: Dramatický život českého politika [Alois Rašín: The Dramatic
Life of a Czech Politician]. Praha 1997, 103-104. – Vencovský, František: Karel Engliš. Brno
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tural tariffs, with the support of the clerical parties, in return for an increase in the
state salary, or congrua, for the clergy, which the Republicans backed.29
The consociational model also explains Slovakia’s position within the Czecho-
slovak First Republic. Contrary to the interpretations of most historians, a debilit-
ating clash among the centralists, who supported a unitary state, the nationalists,
who demanded autonomy, and the minorities, which the nation-state had estranged,
was not characteristic of Slovak politics. In fact, Slovak centralists, nationalists, and
minorities cooperated to set policy within Slovakia and to safeguard Slovak interests,
within the larger context of the Czechoslovak state.
An atmosphere of cooperation existed among the Slovaks from 1918 onwards. 
Representatives of all the prewar Slovak parties signed the Martin Declaration of 31
October 1918, which endorsed Slovakia’s incorporation into the Czechoslovak state.
They then proceeded to form a single fraction in the Revolutionary National
Assembly, while interparty cooperation was also the norm in the more than 300 local
national councils, which had emerged in the wake of the Habsburg Monarchy’s dis-
solution.30 From 1920 onwards, an array of competing parties appeared to have
replaced interparty cooperation, yet they all continued to acknowledge the legitim-
acy of the Czechoslovak state.31
The benefits the Slovaks accrued from their incorporation into Czechoslovakia
bolstered the spirit of consensus. The introduction of universal suffrage enabled the
Slovaks to occupy the vast majority of the elected local government posts in
Slovakia, to secure all of the senior official appointments in Slovakia, such as sheriffs
and high court judges, and to obtain approximately one-fifth of the seats in the new
Czechoslovak National Assembly. In addition, the majority of schools in Slovakia
saw their language of instruction changed from Hungarian to Slovak (rather than
1993 (Universitas Masarykiana edice osobnosti) 17-18, 30-32. – Klimek, Antonín: Boj o
Hrad [Struggle for the Castle]. Vol. 1: Hrad a Pětka. Vnitropolitický vývoj Československa
1918-1926 na půdorysu zápasu o prezidentské nástupnictví [The Castle and the Pětka: The
Internal Political Development of Czechoslovakia, 1918-1926, Based on the Struggle for
Presidential Succession]. Praha 1996, 157-158.
29 Polák, Erik: K otázce rozpadu všenárodní koalice a nastolení vlády mezinárodní bour-
žoazie v Československu v letech 1925-1926 [The Question of the Collapse of the All-
National Coalition and the Establishment of the Multinational Bourgeois Government in
Czechoslovakia 1925-1926]. In: Československý časopis historický 9 (1961) 17-41, espe-
cially 31-35.
30 For interparty cooperation in the Slovak National Councils, see Hronský, Marián: Slo-
vensko na rázcestí [Slovakia at the Crossroads]. Košice 1976, 20-43, 210-215. – See also
Medvecký, K. A.: Slovenský prevrat [The Slovak Revolution]. 4 vols. Trnava 1930-1931,
vol. 2, 17; vol. 3, 81-83; vol. 4, 71-83, 114-115, and 354.
31 See Mlynárik, Jan: The Nationality Question in Czechoslovakia and the 1938 Munich
Agreement. In: Stone, Norman/Strouhal, Eduard (eds.): Czechoslovakia. Crossroads and
Crises. 1918-1988. Houndmills 1989, 92. – See also Angyal, Béla: A csehszlovákiai magyar
pártok viszonya a prágai kormányzatokhoz és a szlovák autonomista törekvésekhez [The
Relationship of the Hungarian Parties in Czechoslovakia to the Governments in Prague
and to Slovak Autonomist Ambitions]. In: Bárdi, Nándor/Simon, Attila (eds.): Integrációs
stratégiák a magyar kisebbségek történetében [Integration Strategies in the History of
Hungarian Minorities]. Somorja 2006 (Disputationes Samarienses 9) 321-341, here 340.
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Czech). With their augmented freedoms of speech and assembly, Slovaks experi-
enced the emergence of new Slovak political and cultural institutions and the expan-
sion of existing ones as well as an explosion of Slovak publications and participation
in mass parties.32
The presence of prominent Slovaks, occasionally even nationalist Slovaks, as min-
isters in each of the governing coalitions throughout the interwar period, and the fact
that a Slovak was prime minister from 1935 to 1938 reinforced broad and enduring
support for Czechoslovakia’s preservation. Moreover, the Slovaks’ presence and
influence in the bureaucracy increased, over the course of the republic’s existence. By
the 1930s onwards, the overwhelming majority of officials in Slovakia came from the
local population, and the number of Slovaks working in government ministries in
Prague expanded exponentially.33
The Slovaks wielded a de facto veto over government legislation, and Slovak pres-
sure had a significant impact on Czechoslovak policy making: it influenced the land
reform legislation in 1919; it forced the government to abandon its policy of col-
onization on the great estates; it impeded ambitions to separate the church and state;
it obstructed the unification of the two separate law codes of the Bohemian Lands
and Slovakia; it blocked plans to centralize the minting of coinage, in order to
protect a mint in Slovakia; it made certain that Slovak, rather than Czech, was the
language of instruction in Slovak schools; it checked the pro-Soviet tendencies that
occasionally surfaced in Czechoslovak foreign policy; and it encouraged the
government to adopt a protectionist trade policy that benefitted Slovak farmers but
crippled the exports of Czech manufacturers.34
32 For specific details about the Slovak cultural renaissance, see Kázmerová, Ľubica: K vývinu
štruktúry školstva na Slovensku v rokoch 1918-1938 [The Evolution of the Structure of
Education in Slovakia 1918-1938]. In: Zemko, Milan/Bystrický, Valerian (eds.): Slovensko
v Československu (1918-1939) [Slovakia in Czechoslovakia (1918-1939)]. Bratislava 2004,
417-440. – Letz, Robert: Prínos Slovenskej ligy k vybudovaniu slovenského školstva (1920-
1948) [The Contribution of the Slovak League to the Building of the Slovak Education
System (1920-1948)]. In: Historický zborník 6 (1996) 48-59. – Šrobár, Vavro: Cultural Pro-
gress in Slovakia. In: Seton-Watson, R. W. (ed.): Slovakia Then and Now. A Political Survey.
London 1931, 107-114, here 110-111. – Mannová, Elena: A Concise History of Slovakia.
Translated by Martin C. Styan and David P. Daniel. Bratislava 2000 (Studia historica
Slovaca 21) 252. – Lipták, Lubomír: Slovensko v 20. storočí [Slovakia in the 20th Century].
Bratislava 2011, 107. – Lettrich, Jozef: History of Modern Slovakia. Toronto 1955, 66.
33 See, for example, Johnson, Owen: Slovakia 1918-1938. Education and the Making of a State.
Boulder 1985 (East European Monographs 180) 88-90, 300-304. – Bakke, Elisabeth:
Doomed to Failure? The Czechoslovak National Project and the Slovak Autonomist Reac-
tion 1918-1939. PhD Dissertation, University of Oslo 1999, 425-426. – Šuchová, Xénia:
Podiel slovákov v ústredných štátných orgánoch v čase Hodžovho premiérstva [The Pro-
portion of Slovaks in the Central State Organs during the Time of Hodža’s Premiership].
In: Historický časopis 48 (2000) no. 4, 626-634. – Macartney, C. A.: Hungary and Her
Successors. The Treaty of Trianon and Its Consequences 1919-1937. London 1937, 141.
34 See, for example, Krajčovičová, Natália: Začiatky pozemkovej reformy na Slovensku v dva-
dsiatych rokoch [The Beginnings of the Land Reform in Slovakia in the 1920s]. In:
Historický časopis 32 (1984) 574-592. – Simon, Attila: Telepesek és telepes falvak Dél-
Szlovákiában a két világháború között [Colonists and Colonial Villages in Southern
Slovakia between the Two World Wars]. Somorja 2009 (Nostra Tempora 15) 153-156. –
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Throughout the interwar period, the Slovaks possessed a degree of political
autonomy that many historians and social scientists underestimate. The staffs of the
Slovak National Council and the Ministry with Full Power for the Administration
of Slovakia were exclusively Slovak and came from across the political spectrum.
From 1923 to 1928, Slovakia had six regions, each of which had a Slovak sheriff 
and a largely elected assembly, four of which never experienced an occasion when a
single party had a majority of delegates. Thus, Slovak control of local government
and interparty cooperation already was the norm in Slovakia in the 1920s.35 
In 1927, the Czechoslovak National Assembly passed a sweeping reform of local
government, which came into effect in 1928 and created four regional offices in
Bohemia, Moravia-Silesia, Slovakia, and Ruthenia. Each had a president and an
assembly of elected and appointed members, which had legislative powers equivalent
to a government ministry and oversaw the activities of the presidents. Historians in
Slovakia and elsewhere have downplayed this development as, at most, a positive
step. They have insisted that, throughout the interwar period, Czechoslovakia
remained a centralized, unitary state and that the clash between Slovak nationalists
and advocates of direct rule from Prague fractured Slovak politics.36 Almost alone
among scholars, Róbert Letz (born 1967) asserted that the Slovak Provincial
Assembly’s establishment produced a “consensual effort” among Slovak politicians
Vnuk, František: Kriza vo vzťahoch. Praha – Vatikán v roku 1925 [Crisis in Relations.
Prague – Vatican in 1925]. In: Historický zborník 9 (1999) 59-71. – Bakke: Doomed to
Failure? 397-398, 425-426, 519 (cf. fn. 33). – Maxwell, Alexander: Choosing Slovakia. Slavic
Hungary, the Czechoslovak Language, and Accidental Nationalism. London 2009 (Inter-
national Library of Political Studies 37) 178-182. – Zavacká, Katarína: Právne systémy a
tradície na Slovensku v období vzniku ČSR [Legal Systems and Traditions in Slovakia
during the Creation of the Czechoslovak Republic]. In: Historický časopis 42 (1994) no. 2,
215-225. – Macartney: Hungary and Her Successors 133-141 (cf. fn. 33). – Johnson: Slovakia
1918-1938, 88-90, 300-301 (cf. fn. 33).
35 Šuchová, Xénia: Idea Československého štátu na Slovensku 1918-1939 [The Idea of the
Czechoslovak State in Slovakia, 1918-1939]. Bratislava 2011, 40-42. – See Janas, Karol: 
K činnosti Slovenskej ľudovej strany v regióne na príklade Považskej Bystrice [The Regional
Activities of the Slovak People’s Party in the Case of Považská Bystrica]. In: Letz, Róbert/
Mulík, Peter/Bartlová, Alena (eds.): Slovenská ľudová strána v dejinách [The Slovak
People’s Party in History]. Martin 2006, 326-335. – Lipscher, Ladislav: K vývinu politickej
správy na Slovensku v rokoch 1918-1939 [The Emergence of the Political Administration
in Slovakia 1918-1939]. Bratislava 1966, 114-116. – Šuchová, Xénia: Problémy organizácie
politickej správy na Slovensku v predmníchovskej republike [Organizational Problems of
the Political Administration in Slovakia in the pre-Munich Republic]. In: Zemko/Bystrický:
Slovensko v Československu 103-107 (cf. fn. 32).
36 See Cambel, Samuel (ed.): Dejiny Slovenska [The History of Slovakia]. Vol. 5: 1918-1945.
Bratislava 1985, 143. – Mikuš, Jozef: Slovakia. A Political History. 1918-1950. Milwaukee/
Wisconsin 1963, 20-21. – Kirschbaum, Stanislav J.: A History of Slovakia. The Struggle for
Survival. New York 1995, 160. – Felak, James: “At the Price of the Republic”. Hlinka’s
Slovak People’s Party 1929-1938. Pittsburgh 1994 (Pitt Series in Russian and East European
Studies) 35. – Čaplovič, Dušan et al. (eds.): Dejiny Slovenska [The History of Slovakia].
Bratislava 2000, 226. – Tome, Peter D./Kováč, Dušan: Slovakia. From Samo to Dzurinda.
Stanford 2001 (Studies of Nationalities) 85-86. – Heimann, Mary: Czechoslovakia. The
State that Failed. New Haven 2009, 54.
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“to assist the economic and cultural development of Slovakia, regardless of their
political persuasion”.37
In the Slovak Provincial Assembly, which oversaw the work of the Provincial
Office, no party ever obtained a majority of the 38 elected seats. The 18 delegates the
central government appointed came from both government and opposition parties.
The rationale for their selection was to take advantage of their technical abilities and
to maintain a delicate ideological balance. In the end, roughly half the seats in the
assembly and precisely half the seats on the various subcommittees that drafted
policy were in the hands of parties that supported the governing coalitions in Prague,
while the remainder went to a range of opposition parties, including representatives
of the Hungarian, German, Jewish, and Rusyn minorities.38 In this sense, the Slovak
Provincial Assembly operated on the principles of a Lijphartian grand coalition.
Interparty cooperation was the norm, resulting in debate that was of a high qual-
ity and usually free from political grandstanding. Although the president of the
Provincial Office had the power to issue decrees, comparable to the heads of all cent-
ral government ministries, he ensured that his decisions had the input and support
of all parties, whose representatives scrutinized and debated all proposals. For ex-
ample, although the Provincial Office had no revenue-generating powers, each year
it drafted a budget and negotiated the total outlay with the central government in
Prague. The draft budget then went to the Provincial Assembly for deliberation,
which provided an opportunity for the assembly’s members to engage in a wide-
ranging debate that touched on all policy areas of the central and regional govern-
ments. Representatives raised and addressed complaints, put forth amendments, and
voted on the constituent parts of the budget and the budget as a whole.
Every budget obtained the approval of the majority of the elected members of the
Provincial Assembly, including representatives of the opposition parties. That back-
ing usually was overwhelming. Allowing the opposition parties to help draft the
budget, extract concessions, and exert a de facto veto, all behind closed doors,
cemented broad support for the budget.39 This arrangement broke down on only
37 Letz, Róbert: Slovenské dejiny [Slovak History]. Vol. 4: 1914-1938. Bratislava 2010, 180.
See also Bartlová, Alena/Thurzo, Ivan: Slovenský perikles [Slovak Pericles]. Bratislava
2009, 189-190.
38 For a detailed summary of the powers of the Provincial Office, see Šuchová, Xénia: Za
vedenie krajinského zriadenia na Slovensku roku 1928. Kompetencie a prvé rozpočty [The
Introduction of the Provincial System in 1928. Competencies and the First Budget]. In:
Historický časopis 45 (1997) no. 3, 487-304. – See also Šuchová (comp.): Prílohy II –
Politický systém [Addendum II – Political System]. In: Zemko/Bystrický: Slovensko 
v Československu 581-588 (cf. fn. 32). – Bartlová, Alena: Niektoré nové prvky v politickom
systéme ČSR a v politickom živote Slovenska na prelome 20. a 30. rokov [Some New
Elements in the Political System in Czechoslovakia and the Political Life of Slovakia at the
Turn of the 1920s and the 1930s]. In: Studia Historica Nitriensia 3 (1995) 97-107, here 102.
– Lipscher: K vývinu politickej správy na Slovensku 176 (cf. fn. 35). – The reports of the
British Foreign Office from 1929 in the National Archives, Foreign Office (FO), 371,
13579/156-158 and 13580/97-122.
39 Pocisk, Jozef: Funkcia krajinského prezidenta a krátke medailónky osobností úradu [The
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one occasion. In 1933, the leading opposition party, the HSĽS, voted against the
budget to protest the arrest of its supporters who had disrupted an official celebra-
tion of Slovakia’s Christianization. In response, the authorities first postponed and
then abandoned judicial proceedings against those in custody, and the HSĽS voted
for the budget in every subsequent year.40
The increase in the powers and influence, from 1929 to 1939, of the Slovak Pro-
vincial Office underlined its effectiveness.41 It employed a growing number of offi-
cials, established a series of branch offices across Slovakia, took control of a number
of quasi-official associations, oversaw and published the first systematic program for
research into economic and social conditions in Slovakia, introduced a new trans-
parency policy for Slovak local government by publishing its decisions and deliber-
ations, and invested heavily in the modernization of Slovakia’s infrastructure.
Politicians from across the political spectrum lauded all of these achievements.42
The depictions of the First Czechoslovak Republic as a centralized state are 
clearly wide of the mark. There was a broad consensus among Slovak politicians in
support of Slovakia’s incorporation within Czechoslovakia. In return, the Slovaks
benefitted from the expansion of the suffrage and the new freedoms of speech and 
assembly, enjoyed a cultural renaissance, influenced the central government’s policy
making, and possessed their own vigorous and influential local government. A vocal
autonomist movement existed, to be sure, but its rhetoric must not mask the exist-
ence of a tradition of compromise, which consociational theory illuminates.43 
Concluding Remarks
The histories of Imperial Austria and the Czechoslovak First Republic demonstrate
the evolution of consociational democracy in Central Europe, both in terms of its
Function of the Provincial President and Short Medallions about the Personalities of the
Office]. In: Péková, Monika (ed.): 80 výročie uzákonenia krajinského zriadenia na Slo-
vensku [The 80th Anniversary of the Establishment of the Provincial System in Slovakia]
(CD-ROM). Bratislava 2008, 4-5. – See also Šuchová: Idea Československého štátu na
Slovensku 151-165 (cf. fn. 35). – Lipscher: K vývinu politickej správy na Slovensku 175-176
(cf. fn. 35). – For more on the debates about the annual budget, see: Krajinský vestník pre
Slovensko, 20 April 1937. 
40 National Archives of Great Britain, FO, 371 (Political Department, General Corres-
pondence)/19495 (from 1935). – Felak: “At the Price of the Republic” 101-111 (cf. fn. 36).
41 Novákova, Veronika: Kompetencia okresných úradov z hľadiska krajského úradu [The
Competencies of the District Offices with Respect to the Provincial Office]. In: Péková: 80
výročie uzákonenia krajinského zriadenia na Slovensku 1-2 (cf. fn. 39). – See also Bielek,
František/Kalovsková, Zlata: Hospodársky úrad pre Slovensko 1918-1928 [The Economic
Office for Slovakia 1918-1928]. Inventár a katalóg [Inventory and Catalog]. Bratislava 1974,
1. – Bartlová: Niektoré nový prvky v politickom système ČSR 102-103 (cf. fn. 38). –
Johnson: Slovakia 1918-1938, 441 (cf. fn. 33). – Lipscher: K vývinu politickej správy na
Slovensku 172-173 (cf. fn. 35).
42 Krajinský vestník pre Slovensko, 10 January 1936.
43 Autonomy was not only a demand of many Slovaks but also Rusyns. Unfortunately, space
prohibits a full consideration of the applicability of the consociational model to Ruthenia
during the interwar years.
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strengthening, in areas where it was once in its nascent form, and in the extension of
its geographical reach into the former Hungarian areas of Slovakia and Ruthenia. In
the years before the First World War, Imperial Austria, a proto-consociational semi-
democracy, displayed some features of consociational democracy. Its governments
approximated the Lijphartian grand coalition model. Elections were increasingly
proportional, not only for the Reichsrat but also in the regional interethnic com-
promises as well as in civil service appointments and education. The diets in the
crown lands and the influence localities had on the schools institutionalized a degree
of group autonomy. The scuttling of certain policies, frequently through seemingly
unconstructive legislative obstruction, pointed toward the principle of mutual veto.
These four traits of consociationalism intensified after 1918, as the Czechoslovak
First Republic gradually became a fully consociational democracy. The politicians of
the republic commonly constructed some form of Lijphartian grand coalition when
building cabinets, a pattern that extended to the extraconstitutional and extraparlia-
mentary groups of party leaders and then, beginning in 1929, to the Political
Committees of the cabinets. As in Imperial Austria, proportionality was evident in
the legislative elections, but it appeared in many other aspects of society, including
civic associations. After 1918, there were small steps toward autonomy for Slovakia
and Ruthenia, and the 1927 provincial law was a major step in that direction. Mutual
vetoes no longer meant obstruction, as they once did in Imperial Austria, but 
merely a threat to the amiability of the parties within a Lijphartian grand coalition,
and logrolling enabled both sides to enact what otherwise might have been contro-
versial policies. Within Czechoslovakia, the spirit of consociationalism extended to
the Slovaks and Rusyns, who, during the latter years of the Kingdom of Hungary,
had little experience with building compromises. In particular, the Slovaks, either as
individual politicians in various parties or through the HSĽS, joined in the
Lijphartian grand coalitions that governed the state. Aside from elections, propor-
tionality was manifested in the Provincial Assemblies. Similarly, the negotiations for
the Slovak budgets, after 1927, demonstrated that the opposition parties wielded an
informal veto. All the parties involved in drafting the budget extracted concessions
and always reached a consensus. The process demonstrated that the Provincial
Assemblies (even more than the Ministry with Full Power for the Administration 
of Slovakia) and the local governing of the schools were advancements in Slovak
autonomy.
The consociational model has served as a tool to explain the success of democra-
cy in deeply divided societies and to resolve conflict in such places as Bosnia and
Herzegovina, Northern Ireland, and South Africa. It can also serve as an analytical
tool, suggesting ways in which existing consociational states might deepen the
consociational experience, in order to better accommodate all the segments of their
societies. The model gains additional usefulness through its application to historical
cases. Examining consociationalism’s historic roots in Austria-Hungary and inter-
war Czechoslovakia enables researchers to understand its origins and to account for
the consociational features that emerged in Austria after 1945, in Czechoslovakia
after the fall of communism in 1989, and after 1993, in the Czech Republic and
Slovakia. Furthermore, applying the consociational model corrects some of the
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errors of interpretation, which are present in the historical literature, that dismiss the
democratic aspects and significance of pre-1914 Austrian politics and portray the
democracy of the Czechoslovak First Republic as defective or merely a case of
Czech domination. No state perfectly employs consociationalism, nor does conso-
ciationalism preclude the failure of democracy. When deeply divided societies 
struggle to adopt democratic ideals, as did Imperial Austria, or when a conso-
ciational democracy stumbles, as with interwar Czechoslovakia, which could have
done more to integrate Slovaks, Germans, Rusyns, Hungarians, and other minorities
into the state structure, the consociational model provides an instrument to gauge
shortcomings. Democracy is not synonymous with majoritarianism, and stable
democracy is possible in deeply divided societies. Given the great variety of institu-
tional arrangements that might be deemed democratic and the particular demands of
deeply divided societies, it is crucial that historians and social scientists appraise both
democratic success and failures with the appropriate standard. When used as a tool
to view the past, consociationalism can provide not only a means of assessing the
progress of a deeply divided society toward building democracy but also the correct
reasons why forays into democratic politics in such a polity failed.
